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NOTE
Honey Badger Does Care About First
Amendment Protections in Trademark Law
Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018)
Dana Kramer*

I. INTRODUCTION
In his viral YouTube video, The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger, comedian
Christopher Gordon narrates a honey badger’s actions as it hunts cobras and
eats larvae from a beehive: “But look, the honey badger doesn’t care. It’s getting stung like a thousand times. It doesn’t give a shit.”1 Shortly after Gordon’s
video went viral, Drape Creative, Inc. and Papyrus-Recycled Greetings, Inc.
began producing greeting cards with catchphrases from Gordon’s YouTube
video even though the companies did not have a licensing agreement with Gordon.2 Subsequently, in Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., Gordon sued those two
companies for trademark infringement.3
Trademarks assist the public in identifying the source of a good, service,
or product. 4 However, trademarks often develop their own social meaning
beyond their source-identifying function, like “Google” or “Band-Aid.”5

* B.S., Culver-Stockton College, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2020. Thank you to Professor Dennis Crouch for suggesting this topic, and thank you
to the editorial staff of the Missouri Law Review for their helpful insight during the editing
process.
1. Christopher Gordon, The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger, YOUTUBE (Jan. 18,

2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4r7wHMg5Yjg&t=3s [perma.cc/HRH7CK72]. Gordon’s video received over ninety million views on YouTube and has its
own Wikipedia page and mobile app. Id.; see also The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Crazy_Nastyass_Honey_Badger
[perma.cc/7HHZ-SASQ] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
2. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 2018).
3. Id. Foul and abusive language cannot be suppressed merely because society
finds it offensive. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted
sub nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019). Moreover, the Lanham Act’s prohibition on registration of immoral and scandalous trademarks is not based on sufficient
justification to suppress First Amendment speech protections. Id. at 1355.
4. 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.3 (5th ed.).
5. Thomas M. Byron, Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s
View of the “Explicitly Misleading” Prong of the Rogers Test, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
1, 3–4 (2011).
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Trademarks are frequently used for non-source-identifying purposes in expressive works such as song titles, video games, or greeting cards.6 In these instances, overly broad interpretations of trademark rights may endanger First
Amendment free speech values.7 Additionally, in trademark infringement
suits, courts inconsistently apply various tests, including the Rogers test and
the likelihood of confusion test, to determine whether use of a particular trademark is infringement, adding another barrier to the protection of free expression.8
In Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit allowed Gordon to pursue his trademark claims against the
greeting card companies.9 But the court’s holding restricts First Amendment
freedom of expression and adds more confusion to an already murky area of
law, causing internal tension in the Ninth Circuit. The Gordon decision also
drives a deeper wedge into a circuit split on the issue of First Amendment protections within trademark law, making this issue ripe for the United States Supreme Court to review. This Note argues trademark laws should be interpreted
to avoid collision with constitutional free speech doctrine, meaning confusion
may need to be tolerated sometimes for the sake of preserving free speech.10
Part II relays the facts and holding of Gordon. Part III provides legal background for the issues presented in Gordon. Part IV relates the Ninth Circuit’s
decision and reasoning in Gordon, and Part V comments on the implications
of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.

6. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating,
“Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to our
expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word
in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”).
7. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 4, Gordon v. Drape
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715); William McGeveran, Four
Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1205, 1206 (2008).
8. See infra Section III.
9. 909 F.3d 257, 260 (9th Cir. 2018).
10. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 271–72 (9th Cir. 2018); see
McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1213; William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 300 (2013) (stating, “In some sets
of cases that raise particularly significant conflicts with other values while routinely
posing little serious risk of passing off, courts should disregard confusion entirely.”).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2015, Plaintiff Christopher Gordon filed a trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act11 against Defendants Drape Creative, Inc. (“DCI”)
and Papyrus-Recycling Greetings, Inc. (“PRG”) (“Defendants,” collectively)
for using catchphrases from Gordon's popular YouTube video.12 PRG, a greeting card manufacturer, is a subsidiary of DCI, a Missouri greeting card design
studio.13 Gordon is a comedian most known for his YouTube video titled The
Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger.14 In his video, Gordon narrates National Geographic footage of a honey badger, using catchphrases such as “Honey Badger
Don’t Give a Shit” (“HBDGS”) and “Honey Badger Don’t Care” (“HBDC”)
to describe the honey badger’s behavior.15 In February 2011, Gordon began
producing and selling items with the HBDC and HBDGS marks, including
books, calendars, t-shirts, and mugs.16 Shortly thereafter, Gordon copyrighted
his narration in the YouTube video and registered HBDC with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for various classes of goods,
which included greeting cards.17 However, Gordon never registered HBDGS
with USPTO.18
In 2012, Gordon’s licensing agent secured agreements with two companies, Zazzle, Inc. and The Duck Company, for honey badger themed products,
including greeting cards.19 That same year, Gordon’s licensing agent met with
PRG to discuss licensing honey badger themed greeting cards.20 However, unlike Zazzle, Inc. and The Duck Company, PRG never signed a licensing agreement with Gordon.21 Nonetheless, PRG began producing its own line of honey
badger greeting cards in June 2012.22
PRG sold a total of seven different greeting cards with Gordon’s catchphrases.23 Of the seven, two were election cards showing a honey badger wearing a patriotic hat and stating “The Election’s Coming.”24 On the inside, one
card read “Me and Honey Badger don’t give a $#%@!” and the other said
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). The Lanham Act is the federal statute governing
trademarks. It addresses activities such as trademark infringement, trademark dilution,
and unfair competition.
12. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 263.
13. Id. at 261.
14. Id.; Christopher Gordon (@czg123), supra note 1.
15. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 261.
16. Id. at 261.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 261–62.
19. Id. at 262.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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“Honey Badger and me just don’t care.”25 Two birthday cards pictured a honey
badger saying either “It’s Your Birthday!” or “Honey Badger Heard It’s Your
Birthday.”26 Inside, both cards read “Honey Badger Don’t Give a Shit.”27 Two
Halloween cards portrayed a honey badger standing next to a pumpkin and
stated “Halloween is Here.”28 Inside, the cards read either “Honey Badger
don’t give a $#*%” or “Honey Badger don’t give a s---.”29 Finally, one card
resembled a Twitter page and depicted a series of messages from HoneyBadger@don’tgiveas---.30 The front stated “Just killed a cobra. Don’t give a
s---”; “Just ate a scorpion. Don’t give a s---”; and “Rolling in fire ants. Don’t
give a s---.”31 Inside, the card read “Your Birthday’s here… I give a s---.”32
The back of each card displayed PRG’s mark and listed websites for both DCI
and PRG.33
In June 2015, Gordon filed an action under the Lanham Act against Defendants alleging trademark infringement.34 The United States District Court
for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for Defendants.35 The district court found Defendants’ greeting cards were expressive
works,36 triggering use of the Rogers test to bar all of Gordon’s claims.37 The
Rogers test is a two-pronged inquiry that generally provides that the Lanham
Act shall not apply unless the underlying work has no artistic relevance whatsoever, or, if the work has some artistic relevance, the Lanham Act does not
apply unless the work explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or content
of the work.38 The Rogers test balances two competing interests: the public
interest in avoiding confusion about the source of a product and the public interest in freedom of expression.39 In granting summary judgment, the district

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. “The Lanham Act . . . ‘creates a comprehensive framework for regulating
the use of trademarks and protecting them against infringement, dilution, and unfair
competition.’” Id. (quoting Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand
Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
35. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 257.
36. “‘Expressive’ uses of trademarks convey an articulable message rather than,
or in addition to, the traditional function of source identification.” William McGeveran,
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 54 (2010).
37. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 263; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989).
38. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
39. Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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court found that Defendants’ use of Gordon’s mark was not explicitly misleading because Defendants did not make “an affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement.”40
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
Gordon argued that Defendants’ greeting cards were not expressive works entitled to First Amendment protection and that Defendants’ use of Gordon’s
catchphrases were not “artistically relevant” to the greeting cards.41 Gordon
also urged that even if the Rogers test did apply, Defendants’ use of his trademark was “explicitly misleading.”42 In response, Defendants argued that their
greeting cards were expressive works that did not identify Gordon as the
source.43 Therefore, Defendants urged that they were entitled to the application
of the Rogers test and protection under the First Amendment.44
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the
case for further fact-finding on “whether defendants’ use of Gordon’s mark is
artistically relevant to their cards.”45 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held that
use of a mark is “artistically relevant” when the mark relates to Defendants’
work and Defendants add their own artistic expression beyond that of the
mark.46
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit published its opinion, Defendants filed a
petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc.47 The petition urged
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “create[d] considerable confusion” in applying
the Rogers test to evaluate artistic relevance.48 Additionally, thirty-seven law
professors filed an amicus brief, arguing that trademark law, unlike copyright
law,49 does not protect creators and their creations but rather protects the
source-identifying function of trademarks.50 The amicus curiae argued that
Gordon’s requirement of an artistry inquiry “threatens Rogers’ protection
across a broad range of works and creates a conflict with copyright law and

40. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 269.
41. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher Gordon at 22–23, Gordon v. Drape

Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715).
42. Id. at 23.
43. Appellee’s Brief at 25–26, Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th
Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715).
44. Id.
45. Gordon, 897 F.3d at 1196.
46. Id.
47. Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Gordon v.
Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-1631).
48. Id. at 17.
49. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, Gordon v. Drape
Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 05-1631).
50. Id.
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with prior decisions of [the Ninth] and other circuits.”51 The amicus curiae
concluded by calling for a decision consistent with Rogers and its progeny.52
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing and issued a superseding opinion.53
The Ninth Circuit again reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and also created new requirements for the second prong of
the Rogers test.54 In its revised opinion, the Ninth Circuit resolved the first
prong of the Rogers test against Gordon, finding that Defendants’ use of the
honey badger phrases was artistically relevant.55 When considering Rogers’
second prong, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s standard
of “an affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement” and
added two subfactors to be considered when analyzing whether use of a mark
is explicitly misleading.56 The first is “the degree to which the junior user uses
the mark in the same ways as the senior user.”57 The second is “the extent to
which the junior user has added his or her own expressive content to the work
beyond the mark itself.”58 The Ninth Circuit also expanded the Rogers test to
include a “likelihood of confusion” analysis if both prongs of the Rogers test
are met.59 Holding that Defendants’ use was artistically relevant as a matter of
law, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further fact-finding of whether
Defendants’ use was explicitly misleading.60

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Trademark law serves a dual purpose in protecting consumers against deception and confusion while protecting the producer’s infringed trademark as
property.61 Generally, these two goals complement one another.62 These ends
are achieved through the trademark holder’s right of action for trademark infringement under the Federal Trademark Act of 1946, otherwise known as the
Lanham Act.63

Id.
Id. at 16.
Gordon v. Drape Creative Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 271–72 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 269–71.
Id. at 270. A junior user is a subsequent user of a mark that has already been
filed with the USPTO or used by another, the senior user. The junior user’s mark is
then called the “junior mark,” and the senior user’s mark is called the “senior mark.”
58. Id. at 270–71.
59. Id. at 264–65.
60. Id. at 271.
61. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 2:2.
62. Id.
63. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 270–71; Byron, supra note 5, at 2.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects trademark holders against false
advertising and infringement.64 The USPTO defines trademark infringement
as “the unauthorized use of a trademark . . . on or in connection with goods
and/or services in a manner that is likely to cause confusion, deception, or mistake about the source of the goods and/or services.”65 Traditionally, trademark
infringement rulings did not violate the First Amendment because commercial
speech did not receive constitutional protection.66 Commercial speech is “a
word, name, symbol, or device . . . used as a trademark to identify and distinguish the source of commercial goods or services.”67 The Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where the
Supreme Court recognized that consumers have an interest “in the free flow of
commercial information.”68 Although the First Amendment now protects commercial speech, more substantial free speech concerns can arise when a mark
limits expressive speech.69
When trademarks are used in expressive ways, courts have to balance the
public’s interest in minimizing confusion as to the source of a good or product
with the public’s interests in preserving its First Amendment freedom of expression.70 However, the interplay between First Amendment protections and
trademark law is still partially unsettled, resulting in jurisdictions employing
different doctrines – such as the “likelihood of confusion” test and the Rogers
test – to analyze whether use of a trademark infringes on the trademark holder’s
rights.71

15 U.S.C § 1125 (2012).
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211.
Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61
SMU L. REV. 383, 396 (2008).
68. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763–65 (1976).
69. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–563 (1980) (stating, “The protection
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation. The First Amendment’s
concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising.”).
70. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211; see, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records,
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions,
353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003); Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017).
71. 6 CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §
22.61 (4th ed. 2018).
64.
65.
66.
67.
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A. “Likelihood of Confusion” Test
Generally, in determining whether infringement claims brought under the
Lanham Act have merit, courts consider whether the preexisting mark used by
a subsequent user might spur a “likelihood of confusion” among consumers.72
The likelihood of confusion test requires the plaintiff to prove it has a protectable trademark and that the defendant’s use of the mark will likely cause confusion among “ordinarily prudent buyers . . . about the source of a product.”73
When applying the likelihood of confusion test to claims brought under the
Lanham Act, courts weigh various factors, such as the strength of the senior
mark, the degree of similarity between the marks, and the defendant’s good
faith in developing its own junior mark.74 This test, though “murky and pliable,” usually “strikes a comfortable balance” between the Lanham Act and First
Amendment protections of free expression.75
However, the likelihood of confusion test does not apply to every trademark case. Popular trademarks often become part of the consumer’s vernacular.76 Trademarks such as “Barbie” become common terms that songs, books,
and movies reference as a way to add expression to the underlying work.77 Alternatively, a junior user may utilize the mark as a means of communication
and “capitalize on knowledge common to speaker and listener.”78 In these instances of expressive use, the applicability of the test breaks down because the
public “is not very likely to be confused into believing that an expressively
used trademark indicates any affiliation between the expressive user and the
trademark holder.”79 When trademarks are used in this manner, the likelihood
of confusion test is ill-suited to address infringement claims because it “ignor[es] the First Amendment concerns implicated by the test.”80 In other
words, the factors considered under the likelihood of confusion test are immaterial when considering expressive works because trademark use in that context
rarely confuses consumers about the source of the work.81

Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 264 (9th Cir. 2018).
Likelihood of Confusion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Byron, supra note 5, at 3.
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900; McGeveran, supra note
7, at 1214.
76. Byron, supra note 5, at 3.
77. Id. at 3–4.
78. Id. at 4–5. For example, the mark “Google” is commonly used to refer to the
search engine and also to describe the act of using the search engine, i.e. when you
“google” something. Id. at 3.
79. Id. at 4.
80. Daniel J. Wright, Explicitly Explicit: The Rogers Test and the Ninth Circuit,
21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 194, 216 (2013).
81. Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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B. The Rogers Test: Expressive Works Using Trademarks
The Rogers test arose out of the difficulties presented by the likelihood of
confusion test.82 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
recognized the need for a different mode of analysis to address the problems
posed by expressive works using trademarks and tackled this issue in Rogers
v. Grimaldi.83 There, Hollywood performer Ginger Rogers filed suit against
the producers and distributors of the film “Ginger and Fred,” which followed
the story of two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and
her co-star, Fred Astaire.84 Rogers claimed the movie’s title created a false
impression that the movie was about her or sponsored by her because her name
was in the title of the work.85 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted summary judgment to the producers and distributors, concluding that the movie was a work of artistic expression and not a
commercial product.86 Therefore, the district court held that the Lanham Act
did not apply to titles of expressive works, and accordingly the movie was entitled to full First Amendment protection.87
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.88 However, it
found the district court’s holding “unduly narrow[ed] the scope of the [Lanham] Act,” reasoning that the holding would insulate movie titles almost entirely from Lanham Act claims.89 The Second Circuit then ruled that the Lanham Act could be applied to titles of expressive works.90 The court stated that
“titles, like the artistic works they identify, are of a hybrid nature, combining
artistic expression and commercial promotion.”91 The court then formulated
the Rogers test to balance trademark rights and First Amendment rights:
[The Lanham] Act should be construed to apply only to artistic works
only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression . . . . [T]hat balance will
normally not support application of the Act unless the title has no artis-

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Byron, supra note 5, at 5.
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 996–97.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 998.
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tic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or
content of the work. 92

The Second Circuit’s rationale behind the Rogers test considered consumers’ interest in not being misled and in “enjoying the results of the author’s
freedom of expression.”93
The original Rogers test consists of two prongs.94 The first prong applies
when use of a mark has no artistic relevance to the underlying work.95 De
minimis artistic relevance is sufficient to meet Rogers’ first prong.96 For example, the Ninth Circuit found a band’s use of the term “Barbie” in a song
titled “Barbie Girl” to be artistically relevant because the song was about Barbie and the values she represented according to the band.97 If the use of mark
has no artistic relevance, the Lanham Act will prohibit its use as trademark
infringement because a “misleading [use] with no artistic relevance cannot be
sufficiently justified by a free expression interest.”98 If a mark has artistic relevance, the second prong applies when use of the mark in the expressive work
explicitly misleads the consumer as to the source or content of the work.99 If
either prong is met, the use of the mark will be prohibited as trademark infringement.100 The Second Circuit found that the title at issue in Rogers had
artistic relevance and did not explicitly mislead consumers as to the content or
sponsorship of the defendants’ film.101 Therefore, Rogers’ claims under the
Lanham Act were barred.102

92. Id. at 999. The Second Circuit additionally rejected the “no alternative avenues” argument articulated by Rogers. Id. This standard applies when a title “is so
intimately related to the subject matter of a work that the author has no alternative
means of expressing what the work is about,” thereby implicating First Amendment
concerns. Id. at 998. The Second Circuit ultimately rejected the “no alternative avenues” standard because it did not sufficiently accommodate public interest in free expression. Id. at 999.
93. Id. at 998.
94. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31:144:50.
95. Id.
96. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2003).
97. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
98. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
99. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31:144:50.
100. Id.
101. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. “As [the producer] explains in an affidavit, Rogers
and Astaire are to him ‘a glamorous and care-free symbol of what American cinema
represented during the harsh times which Italy experienced in the 1930s and 1940s.’ In
the film, he contrasts this elegance and class to the gaudiness and banality of contemporary television, which he satirizes.” Id.
102. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/11

10

Kramer: Honey Badger Does Care About First Amendment Protections in Trade

2019]

FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN TRADEMARK LAW

883

The Rogers test is merely a defense to trademark infringement and does
not involve a constitutional analysis even though its purpose is to protect free
speech.103 The Supreme Court has previously held that a defense with an imbedded free speech protection is preferred to a constitutional analysis, as
demonstrated in Eldred v. Ashcroft,104 a parallel copyright case: “[C]opyright’s
built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address [First Amendment concerns].”105 Just as in copyright law, trademark law inherently protects
the unauthorized use of a senior mark.106 Many trademark uses fall outside the
realm of trademark protection because the mark is not used to identify the
source of a good.107 In such instances, and as exemplified in Rogers, free
speech concerns “pervade[] the common law of trademark.”108

C. Variations of the Rogers Test
Though the Rogers test originated in the Second Circuit, other courts have
adopted it as well, including the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.109 No court has expressly rejected the
Rogers test, although the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits still apply the likelihood of confusion test. 110 Appellate courts that have adopted the Rogers test
apply it in essentially three different categories: the strict Rogers test, the quasiRogers test, and the Rogers “rollercoaster test” of the Ninth Circuit.111

1. The Strict Rogers Test
The first category – the strict Rogers test – applies the Rogers analysis as
originally articulated by the Second Circuit.112 Under this approach, only explicitly misleading uses of a trademark are regulated under the Lanham Act and

MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31:144:50.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 221.
Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 187, 189 (2004).
107. Id. at 194.
108. Id. at 195.
109. See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664–65
(5th Cir. 2000); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003); Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of
Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012).
110. See Radiance Found., Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P., 786 F.3d 316, 324 (4th Cir. 2015);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’n, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994); PAM Media, Inc. v. Am. Research Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (10th Cir. 1995).
111. Byron, supra note 5, at 9.
112. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
103.
104.
105.
106.
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implicitly misleading trademark uses are subjected to First Amendment protections and outside the reach of the Lanham Act.113
The Eleventh Circuit falls within the strict Rogers category.114 In University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art, a university brought suit
against an artist for depicting the university’s football jerseys in his paintings,
prints, and calendars memorializing notable football moments.115 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama initially applied the
likelihood of confusion test and concluded that the artist’s use of the mark produced “merely some likelihood of confusion.”116 However, recognizing that
paintings, prints, and calendars are entitled to First Amendment protection, the
Eleventh Circuit, on appeal, adopted the Rogers test to balance the artist’s interest in free speech and the university’s interest in trademark rights.117 The
court found the artist’s use of the university’s mark to be artistically relevant
because “the uniforms’ colors and designs [were] needed for a realistic portrayal of famous scenes from [the university’s] football history.”118 The court
further concluded the artist’s works were not explicitly misleading because the
artist’s use of the mark was “mere inclusion” and was substantially outweighed
by the artist’s interest in expression.119 Therefore, the artist’s works did not
infringe on the university’s trademark.120
The Sixth Circuit similarly adopted this approach in Parks v. LaFace Records.121 In Parks, civil rights icon Rosa Parks brought suit against a record
producer and the rap duo OutKast for using her name in the title of their song
Rosa Parks.122 After noting that many other jurisdictions had adopted the Rogers test, the court explicitly rejected the likelihood of confusion test and determined the Rogers test was the best approach for balancing Parks’ trademark
interests with OutKast’s First Amendment interests. .123
In applying Rogers, the court held that the use of Parks’ name was not
explicitly misleading because the song “ma[de] no explicit statement that the
work [was] about [Rosa Parks] in any direct sense.”124 However, the Sixth
Circuit found a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the song’s title was
Byron, supra note 5, at 10 (emphasis added).
See New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d at 1277–78.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1278–79.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
329 F.3d 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 441.
Id. at 448–52. The court adopted the Rogers test after looking at its application
in a case from the Ninth Circuit where a band used the trademarked term “Barbie” in
the title of their song. Id. at 451; see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d
894 (9th Cir. 2002).
124. Parks, 329 F.3d at 459.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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artistically relevant to the song itself.125 Leaning toward a finding of no artistic
relevance, the court questioned the relevancy of the song’s title to the lyrics:
“OutKast’s only explanation . . . is that the name Rosa Parks is a ‘symbol.’ It
is, indeed, a symbol, but the question is how the symbol is artistically related
to the content of a song that appears to be diametrically opposed to [the qualities Rosa Parks represents].”126 The Sixth Circuit then remanded the case to
decide this question.127

2. The Quasi-Rogers Category
The second category adopts the theory behind Rogers but not its exact
articulation, resulting in a quasi-Rogers test.128 The quasi-Rogers test, in comparison to the strict Rogers test, is somewhat less protective of expression and
more protective of trademark holders’ rights.129
The Second Circuit itself adopted this approach in Cliff Notes v. Bantam
Doubleday Publishing shortly after Rogers was decided.130 In Cliff Notes, publishers of the study guide series Cliff Notes brought suit against the producers
of a parody of the series called Spy Notes, alleging that the cover of Spy Notes
gave consumers the impression that the parody was the publishers’ product.131
The Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction
against the producers of Spy Notes.132 On appeal, the Second Circuit recognized the Rogers test only so far as to weigh “public interest in free expression
against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion.”133 The court reasoned that parodies, being expressive works, required more protection than ordinary commercial speech.134 The Second Circuit then expanded the second
element of the Rogers test to include a likelihood of confusion analysis.135 In
applying this quasi-Rogers test, the court held that the parodic nature of Spy
Notes outweighed the likelihood of consumer confusion and vacated the injunction.136

Id. at 458.
Id. at 455–56.
Id. at 459.
Byron, supra note 5, at 12.
Id. at 14.
See Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
494 (2d Cir. 1989).
131. Id. at 492.
132. Id. at 493.
133. Id. at 494.
134. Id. at 495.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 497.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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The Fifth Circuit also adopted this approach to internal trademark use in
expressive works.137 In Westchester Media v. PRL Doubleday Publishing, the
Fifth Circuit applied the Rogers test when fashion designer Ralph Lauren
brought an infringement suit against a magazine publisher for using Lauren’s
“POLO” mark as a title.138 The court applied the likelihood of confusion test
to determine whether use of the mark was explicitly misleading under the second prong of Rogers and found that a likelihood of confusion existed between
the magazine publishers and Lauren’s POLO marks.139

3. The Rogers Rollercoaster Category
The third category is “more confusion-averse and expression unfriendly”
in comparison to the other two categories.140 This category – dubbed here as
the Rogers rollercoaster – is the most unfriendly to First Amendment protections in infringement actions and sporadically applies a partial likelihood of
confusion test to Rogers analyses.141 The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach
after deciding “the Barbie cases”142 and a case involving the popular video
game Grand Theft Auto, but its application has been “somewhat facile” and
“confusing.”143
In the first Barbie case, Mattel v. MCA Records, the Ninth Circuit applied
a strict interpretation of Rogers.144 Mattel, the manufacturer of Barbie dolls,
brought claims under the Lanham Act against the music companies that produced the song “Barbie Girl” by the Danish band Aqua for using Barbie in the
title of the song.145 The lyrics of the song “poke fun” at Barbie for the values
she represents according to Aqua.146
The Ninth Circuit applied Rogers in its analysis.147 Considering the lyrics
of the song in relation to its title, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of Barbie

137. See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664–65
(5th Cir. 2000).
138. Id. at 664–667.
139. Id. at 667.
140. Byron, supra note 5, at 15.
141. See generally Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 894 (9th Cir.
2002); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir.
2003); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir.
2003); Brown v. Elec. Arts. Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013); Twentieth Century
Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2017).
142. See infra note 144–62.
143. Byron, supra note 5, at 8; see also MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 894; Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d at 796; E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., 547 F.3d at 1095.
144. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 902; Byron, supra note 5, at 8.
145. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 899.
146. Id. at 901.
147. Id. at 902.
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in the song’s title was artistically relevant to the song itself.148 For the second
prong of Rogers, the court found that the song title did not explicitly mislead
consumers regarding the work’s origin because use of a trademark alone was
not sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Rogers.149 If use of a mark alone
was sufficient to meet Rogers’ second prong, the court reasoned, it would nullify Rogers because such minimal use would automatically tip the balance in
favor of protecting the rights of trademark holders without considering free
speech interests.150 The court noted that trademark rights do not authorize the
trademark owner to stifle a third party’s expressive use of the mark.151 Additionally, the court chose not to apply the likelihood of confusion test because it
“failed to take account of the public’s interest in free expression” when “trademarks transcend their identifying purpose.”152 In light of these considerations,
the court affirmed summary judgment for the music producers.153
The Ninth Circuit next applied Rogers in the second Barbie case, Mattel
v. Walking Mountain Productions.154 There, a photographer used Barbie dolls
to produce photographs with social and political connotations and used Barbie
in the title of his work.155 Mattel brought claims against the photographer under the Lanham Act.156 The court considered the cultural significance of Barbie
in its analysis: “Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First
Amendment protections come into play.”157 The court noted the role of the
“Barbie” mark in modern culture, referencing the song at issue in MCA Records.158 The Walking Mountain court then applied the Rogers test in essentially
the same way as in MCA Records and held that the public’s interest in free
expression outweighed the risk of consumer confusion about Mattel’s endorsement of the photographer’s works.159 However, the Ninth Circuit, in noting
that the term Barbie had become part of the public vernacular “outside the
bounds of trademark law,”160 seemed to suggest Rogers only applied to the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 792 (9th Cir.

2003).
155. Id. at 796. In his photographs, photographer Thomas Forsythe depicted Barbie
in the following manners: a nude Barbie on a vintage Hamilton Beach malt machine, a
Barbie head in a fondue pot, and four Barbie dolls wrapped in tortillas, covered with
salsa, lying in a casserole dish inside a lit oven. Id.
156. Id. at 797.
157. Id. at 807.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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unauthorized use of marks with a “transcendent meaning” that had become part
of the culture.161
The Ninth Circuit again employed Rogers in 2008 and expanded the test’s
applicability beyond titles.162 In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000 v. Rock Star Videos, the owner of a strip club brought suit against the creators of the video game
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas under the Lanham Act for their portrayal of a
strip club in the game that resembled the owner’s club.163 Addressing the first
prong of Rogers, the Ninth Circuit held that a work’s artistic relevance must
only be above zero to satisfy the first prong.164 However, unlike Walking
Mountain, the court did not consider whether the owner’s club had any cultural
significance.165
The court then analyzed whether the use of the owner’s club explicitly
misled consumers.166 The court posited that the relevant inquiry was whether
the video game would make players think the club owner somehow sponsored
the game.167 The court assessed the potential confusion with a partial likelihood of confusion analysis, considering factors such as the similarity between
the marks and the lack of evidence of actual confusion among consumers.168
This analysis was significantly different than the Barbie cases where the Ninth
Circuit did not utilize the likelihood of confusion test.169 Moreover, the Rock
Star Videos court did not weigh the public interest in receiving the expression.170 The Ninth Circuit subsequently dismissed the strip club owner’s
claims.171
These three cases created tension within the Ninth Circuit pertaining to
the application of the Rogers test, as exemplified in its progeny. For instance,
in 2013, Brown v. Electronic Arts explicitly rejected the likelihood of confusion test – as in MCA Records – but did not consider the cultural significance
of the mark at issue – as in Walking Mountain.172 But, in 2017 in Twentieth
Century Fox Television v. Empire Distribution, the Ninth Circuit employed the
likelihood of confusion test when considering the second prong of Rogers and

161. Id.; Wright, supra note 80, at 207.
162. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.

2003).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1100–01.
See Wright, supra note 80, at 207–08.
E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., 547 F.3d at 1100–01; see Byron, supra note 5, at 15–

16.
171. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 Inc., 547 F.3d at 1101.
172. Brown v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013).
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considered whether the trademark had “attained a meaning beyond its sourceidentifying function.”173
The United States Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the tangle of
trademark tests as applicable to principles of free speech in expressive
works,174 leaving district and circuit courts to decide which test to apply in a
given case, resulting in disparate analyses.175 Instead of resolving the confusion surrounding the Ninth Circuit’s application of Rogers and other trademark
tests, Gordon merely adds to the uncertainty.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In its superseding opinion, the Ninth Circuit found that Defendants’ use
of Gordon’s mark was artistically relevant and left the determination of
whether Defendants’ use was explicitly misleading to the jury.176 The court
expanded the “explicitly misleading” prong of Rogers to consider additional
subfactors which relate to the junior user’s artistry and use.177 Further, the
court stated that if a jury found Defendants’ use of the mark to be explicitly
misleading, the use was not infringing unless the jury also determined a likelihood of confusion existed between Defendants’ and Gordon’s use.178
The Gordon court began its analysis by clarifying the burden of proof in
a trademark infringement action under the Rogers test.179 The court stated that
the burden of proof initially lies with the defendant to make a threshold showing that “[the mark’s] allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work
protected by the First Amendment.”180 If the defendant makes this threshold

173. Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192,
1197–99 (9th Cir. 2017).
174. The most recent Supreme Court decision addressing trademark law was Matal
v. Tam, where a rock band’s application for a trademark was denied based on a provision in the Lanham Act that prohibits the registration of a disparaging trademark. 137
S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). There, the Supreme Court held that the disparagement provision in the Lanham Act violated First Amendment protections of speech. Id. at 1765.
175. See Wright, supra note 80, at 209; see e.g., Roxbury Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Penthouse Media Group, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175–76 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (considering
whether consumers would be misled as to the source of the defendant’s movie and not
engaging in a likelihood of confusion analysis); Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F. Supp.
2d 883, 887–88 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (applying the likelihood of confusion test and considering the cultural significance of the mark).
176. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc. 909 F.3d 257, 271 (9th Cir. 2018).
177. Id. at 270.
178. Id. at 264–65.
179. Id. at 264.
180. Id.
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showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff,181 who then must meet one of Rogers’ two prongs and also show that the defendant’s use is likely to cause confusion.182
The court quickly assessed whether Defendants met the burden of
proof.183 Noting that greeting cards are expressive works entitled to First
Amendment protections, the court found that Defendants met their initial burden.184 This finding shifted the burden to Gordon “to raise a triable issue of
fact as to at least one of Rogers’ two prongs.”185
The court first considered whether the use of Gordon’s mark was artistically relevant to Defendants’ greeting cards.186 The court held as a matter of
law that the mark was artistically relevant to the greeting cards because “the
phrase is the punchline on which the cards’ humor turns.”187 Gordon therefore
failed to meet Rogers’ first prong.188
The court next addressed the second prong of Rogers.189 The court clarified that when considering this prong the focus should be on the “nature of the
junior user’s behavior rather than on the impact of the use.”190 The court also
stated that use of a mark alone may sometimes be sufficient to meet the “explicitly misleading” prong of Rogers if consumers would normally identify the
source by use of the mark alone.191 This statement departs from previous Ninth
Circuit precedent, such as MCA Records and Rock Star Videos, which held that
use of a trademark alone is insufficient to be explicitly misleading.192 The court
distinguished those cases from Gordon, reasoning that in MCA Records and
Rock Star Videos, no consumer would have related the use of the mark alone
to the trademark holder.193 In Gordon, however, consumers could relate use of
Gordon’s mark alone to identify him as the source of the work.194
The court then articulated the first new subfactor under Rogers’ second
prong: the degree to which the junior mark is used as compared to the senior
mark.195 The court compared Gordon to MCA Records and Walking Mountain,
cases where the junior mark was used in completely different ways than the
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1246–1246 (9th Cir.
2013)) (internal marks omitted).
191. Id. at 270.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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senior mark.196 The court reasoned this subfactor would prevent a junior user
from alleging First Amendment protections “merely because the product being
created by [the junior user] is also ‘art.’”197
The second additional subfactor under the “explicitly misleading” prong
of Rogers is “the extent to which the junior user has added his or her own expressive content to the work beyond the mark itself.”198 The Ninth Circuit articulated its rationale behind adding this subfactor to the second prong of Rogers: “[U]sing a mark as the centerpiece of an expressive work itself, unadorned
with any artistic contribution by the junior user, may reflect nothing more than
an effort to induce the sale of goods or services by confusion or lessen . . . the
commercial value of a competitor’s mark.”199 The court found support for this
proposition in previous Ninth Circuit cases, Rock Star Videos and Brown,
where a junior mark was incorporated into the body of an expressive work only
as a component of the larger work.200 Considering these cases, this new subfactor is similar to the court’s holding in its previous opinion.201
After incorporating these new subfactors to the Rogers test, the court declined to declare as a matter of law that Defendants’ use of Gordon’s mark was
explicitly misleading.202 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Defendants generally pasted Gordon’s mark into their greeting cards.203 Additionally, the court
noted that in some of the greeting cards, Defendants used Gordon’s mark without any other text.204 Therefore, the court found that a triable issue of fact
existed as to whether Defendants added their own expression to its greeting
cards in using Gordon’s mark or merely used Gordon’s mark in the same manner as Gordon.205 The Ninth Circuit accordingly remanded the case.206

V. COMMENT
The Rogers test is inconsistently applied, particularly within the Ninth
Circuit, as is apparent in its case law. Some courts still utilize the likelihood of
confusion test; others apply one of the three categories of Rogers tests.207 The
Ninth Circuit’s superseding opinion in Gordon falls into the quasi-Rogers test

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
539 (1987)).
200. Id.
201. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2018).
202. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271.
203. Id. at 261.
204. Id. at 271.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra Part III.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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category because it adds a likelihood of confusion analysis to the Rogers test.208
The subfactors articulated by the court, however, blur the lines between the
Rogers test and the likelihood of confusion test. Moreover, though the Ninth
Circuit seemingly departed from its previous holding that required a junior user
to add his own artistry to his underlying work, the court tucked this previous
holding under the second prong of Rogers in its new opinion.
The outcome of this case raises free speech concerns. Gordon’s holding
may result in a chilling effect on creators’ freedom of expression. Junior users
may refrain from creating new works out of concern for exposure to complex
litigation. Additionally, Gordon drives the wedge deeper into the circuit split
among courts that employ the Rogers test.209

A. Implications of the Gordon Decision
Gordon adds to the turmoil within the Ninth Circuit and further splits the
circuits regarding expressive use in trademark infringement cases. This, in
turn, makes trademark litigation more difficult and uncertain. In addition, the
uncertainty and the cost of litigating these claims further isolates artists. The
likelihood of confusion test already requires long, fact-intensive, and expensive
litigation, and those problems are amplified when courts use a quasi-Rogers
test.210
Professor William McGeveran argues the possibility of costly litigation
discourages people from engaging in permissible activities related to trademarks that the law would otherwise allow and should encourage.211 In supporting this stance, Professor McGeveran cites to the defendant photographer
from Walking Mountain who revealed that his overall costs for litigating his
defense exceeded two million dollars, a cost hardly affordable for artists and
small businesses.212
The expense of litigation combined with the uncertainty of the applicable
test chills the free expression of junior users. Individuals may be less inclined
to create because of the looming threat of liability. But even if an individual is
not subject to liability, the cost of reaching that outcome through the judicial
system is not worth the expense.213 Even those who can afford to defend expressive trademark use take excessive precautions to eliminate the possibility
of a dispute. For example, Google allows trademark holders to ban the use of
their marks in third party advertisements and reality television producers blur

Gordon, 909 F.3d at 257.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 31.139; Ramsey, supra note 68, at 386.
McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1221.
See McGeveran, supra note 36, at 62.
Id. This amount includes the cost for both the trademark and copyright claims
raised in the suit. Id. at 62–63.
213. Id.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
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out unlicensed trademark logos that appear on television.214 These extra precautions are far beyond legal requirements, yet these junior users take these
unnecessary measures to avoid costly litigation.
Moreover, the Gordon decision blurs the lines between the second prong
of Rogers and the likelihood of confusion test, which will further complicate
litigation. The first subfactor, concerning the similarity of use between the
junior and senior marks, is similar to factors considered in the likelihood of
confusion test, such as the similarity between the marks and the strength of the
senior mark.215 The Ninth Circuit noted that the “explicitly misleading” prong
of Rogers is principally a more demanding version of the likelihood of confusion test and that “a plaintiff who satisfies the ‘explicitly misleading’ portion
of Rogers should therefore have little difficulty showing a likelihood of confusion.”216 A likelihood of confusion analysis serves no purpose if the same factors are applied and the outcome of the likelihood of confusion test will be the
same as under the Rogers test. Requiring an additional likelihood of confusion
is therefore superfluous and will only lengthen and complicate litigation.
Issues arise with the second subfactor articulated by the Gordon opinion
as well. This subfactor – whether the junior user added expressive content to
the underlying work – reflects the Ninth Circuit’s original holding, which
looked to whether the junior user added his own artistry to the underlying
work.217 The court merely used “expressive content” as a stand-in for “artistry.”218 The difference between the two opinions is that the court slotted this
inquiry into Rogers’ second prong instead of the first prong.219 However, the
effect remains the same because the junior user still must show that he added
his own expression, which creates an added barrier to permissible free speech
in expressive works.220
In his amicus curiae brief, Stanford University Professor Mark Lemley
urged that Defendants’ use of HBDC and HBDGS were not source-identifying
uses of Gordon’s mark and therefore, trademark law should not protect Gordon’s property right in the mark.221 The original Rogers test distinguished between using a mark in an expressive way and using a mark to identify the
source of a company’s goods or services.222 The Rogers test required only

Id. at 63.
S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2014).
Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 272 n.7 (9th Cir. 2018).
Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 897 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1194–95.
Id.
Gordon, 909 F.3d at 271.
Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 4, Gordon v. Drape
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715).
222. Id. at 7.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
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minimal relevance to trigger First Amendment protection.223 This low bar allowed artists to express themselves and not feel inhibited by the possibility of
a trademark infringement action. But Gordon’s holding raises the bar. A defendant now must add expressive content to his underlying work, a requirement
that parallels the previous Gordon opinion.224 This requirement, Lemley urged,
invades the realm of copyright law.225 Lemley argued that the overextension
of trademark rights in Gordon could be prevented by “recognizing that Gordon
has a right to use his phrase as a trademark for a line of greeting cards but not
a trademark right in the [punchline] of a joke.”226
Although trademark law should give reasonable notice of the standard a
court will apply, courts should generally avoid a constitutional analysis of
trademark law if the action can be resolved on other grounds.227 The Rogers
test as originally articulated by the Second Circuit is not a constitutional analysis, but the test inherently incorporates First Amendment concerns by protecting trademarks used in an expressive manner.228 Constitutional decisions are
known to freeze the development of law, which could negatively impact the
development of the Lanham Act because the Act relies on common law standards.229 To achieve this aim, courts should interpret trademark claims narrowly
and trademark defenses broadly to protect expression, meaning that some confusion may be necessary for the sake of preserving rights of expression under
the First Amendment.230
The Supreme Court has noted that a little confusion may be tolerated in
order to protect freedom of speech:
The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the
part of consumers followed from the very fact that . . . an originally
descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the

223. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.3d 994, 999 (2d. Cir. 1989); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003).
224. Gordon, 909 F.3d at 270.
225. Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 14, Gordon v. Drape
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-56715).
226. Id. at 15.
227. See e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 187, 188–89, 209 (2004); McGeveran, supra note 7, at 1211–14; see also
Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 906 n.16 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to
rule on the First Amendment challenge after finding for defendant on other grounds).
228. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.3d 994, 998 (2d. Cir. 1989).
229. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 12.
230. Ramsey, supra note 67, at 448.
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undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on
use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first. 231

Moreover, applying trademark law to prevent otherwise permissible
speech should require strong justification.232 Strong justification is absent,
however, when a mark is used within an expressive work as it has little, if any,
effect on the senior mark.233 A minute chance of confusion should not outweigh First Amendment speech protections. The Ninth Circuit recognized this
in Rock Star Videos – few people would have believed the strip club owner was
connected with the makers of Grand Theft Auto.234

B. Suggestions and Recommendations
The Ninth Circuit should increase consistency in its application of the
Rogers test. The quasi-Rogers test articulated in Gordon only adds to the confusion of the test’s application in the Ninth Circuit. Adopting a strict Rogers
test would remedy the inconsistency within the Ninth Circuit and simplify litigation for defendants who wish to defend their expressive use of trademarks.
The original Rogers test, as articulated by the Second Circuit, recognized
that confusion was not the only concern in third party trademark use – First
Amendment protections need to be addressed as well.235 Restricting use of a
mark because of slight confusion infringes on the public’s right to free speech
and expression. If a trademark is not used to source-identify, then consumer
interest in free expression should outweigh application of the Lanham Act.236
A strict Rogers test would allow permissible expressive speech to trump a minute risk of confusion.
Weighing the likelihood of confusion in the junior mark merely lengthens
and adds expense to litigation. A strict application of Rogers would eliminate
the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely, along with other unnecessary considerations, such as whether a defendant added his own expressive content to
his work, thereby shortening litigation and removing the chilling effect on free
speech. Moreover, this would provide much needed consistency in the Ninth
Circuit for future infringement actions.
The application of the Rogers test is an issue ripe for the Supreme Court’s
review. If the Supreme Court were to hear a case involving this issue, it could
resolve the inconsistencies across the United States. This would provide guidance to both trademark holders and junior users as to what test a court will

231. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
122 (2004) [KP Permanent I].
232. McGeveran & McKenna supra note 10, at 305.
233. Id.
234. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2008).
235. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
236. McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 10, at 289.
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apply in trademark infringement actions. Until that time, the Ninth Circuit
needs to create consistency within its own courts to protect and properly balance First Amendment and trademark rights.

VI. CONCLUSION
Gordon adds to the tangled web that is the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
trademark infringement and contributes to the Rogers test circuit split. The
Ninth Circuit, though it issued a superseding opinion, stood by its controversial
application of Rogers. The court’s holding further splits circuits on the issue,
which makes defending expressive trademark use a complex and expensive
process for litigants. Lengthy and costly litigation will deter artists and creators
from using trademarks in an otherwise permissible manner and chill this type
of work. The effect of Gordon’s overly broad application of the Rogers test
may endanger First Amendment free speech principles.
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